

# REVIEWS

**Leadership: The Warrior's Art** edited by Christopher Kolenda, Army War College Foundation Press, Carlisle, Pa., 2001, 437 pages, \$19.95 (softcover), ISBN 0-9709682-1-3.

"Personal experience [of leadership]," observes volume editor Major Christopher Kolenda in echoing the sentiments of General George S. Patton, Jr., military theorist Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, and others, "therefore, must be augmented by the records of others and synthesized by the insights of history, philosophy, and theory." To be sure, the purpose of this superb anthology, *Leadership: The Warrior's Art* — based upon the experience and insight of others — is to provide guidance and insight for aspiring or practicing military leaders to better understand their roles and responsibilities and become more effective.

This interesting volume consists of 19 mainly previously unpublished essays on various aspects of leadership written largely by former military figures (ranging in rank from major to retired full general) and civilian faculty members of the West Point departments of History, Social Sciences, and Behavioral Science and Leadership. As such, from a theoretical and academic — and in many cases a practical — perspective, the authors are experts in their fields and of their essay subjects. The study begins with a short foreword by retired General Barry R. McCaffrey, in which he places the essays within the overall context of leadership development, followed by an insightful introduction by Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.).

This anthology consists of three sections: "Ancient and Modern Concepts of Leadership," "Historical Case Studies," and "Contemporary Experiences and Reflections on Leadership." The first section (five essays) provides the foundation for the book by enumerating definitions, concepts, and theories of leadership. The essence of leadership, suggests Kolenda, is "to inspire the spirit and act of following regardless of external circumstances." The attributes and characteristics of leaders are further examined, as is the complex issue of evaluating leader effectiveness. Building unit cohesion, and the implications for doing so in the contemporary U.S. Army, and the role and importance of discipline in developing initiative, are also covered in the first section.

Section II, Historical Case Studies, consists of seven essays. These articles highlight the leadership and character of Alexander the Great and Frederick the Great; American military leader competence in World War I and an anatomy of "heroism under fire" in the Second World War; the ethical dilemma faced by General Curtis E. LeMay in the fire bombing of Japan; and perceptions of German Army unit excellence and of Soviet Army tactical initiatives. Whether one agrees with their respective conclusions or not, all of

these historical essays are well-written and interesting.

Seven essays are in Section III, Contemporary Experiences and Reflections on Leadership. This is perhaps the most relevant section of the study. Noteworthy in this section are "Charisma" by retired Brigadier General John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, and Colonel Robert W. Cone's "Battle Focused Training." These essays stress positive aspects of leader selection, training, and development, and the inculcation of the warrior spirit. It would have been perhaps even more worthwhile to read of realistic and honest solutions to the current *malaise* in the U.S. Army, the result of a lack of training and maintenance funds; frequent deployments on peacekeeping-type missions; rampant officer "ticket-punching" and blatant careerism; the prevailing (and destructive) "zero defects" environment; and a deterioration of professional ethics and of a sense of duty and responsibility.

*Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, living up to McCaffrey's commentary in the book's Foreword, provides "an enormous contribution to understanding how organizations can produce extraordinary success by building teams capable of heroic behavior." This interesting, thought-provoking, and intellectually challenging anthology is highly recommended to military and civilian readers — and especially to the Army's current senior officers as a reminder of the characteristics of and the need for genuine leadership in the Army today.

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**Lifting the Fog of War** by Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley; Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2000, 263 pages, \$25.00 (hardcover).

Reflecting on Clausewitz's "fog of war," Admiral Owens wrestles with the uncertainty of the battlefield. To emerge from the "fog," he proposes a transformation in the way in which our military wages war. He argues that advances in space-based systems, communications, and computers are capable of giving commanders a real-time picture of the battlefield reducing, if not eliminating, uncertainty. *Lifting the Fog of War* embraces high technology to transform the military into a faster, lighter, and smarter force responsive to securing our national interests and transforming the way in which it wages war. This mantra reflects post-Cold War realities in which U.S. troops will fight swift regional skirmishes rather than set battles with heavy equipment.

Based on his service as Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens offers uncanny insight to the inner world of service parochialism. He contends that the Department of Defense (DoD) is inefficient and archaic. He argues that the unified approach to weapons acquisition and force structure fails to preclude a defense trans-

formation removed from service parochialism. Moreover, ingrained in "jointness" is a bureaucratic resistance that has thwarted efforts to launch a Revolution in Military Affairs. Therefore, Admiral Owens calls for a transformation of the DoD.

Two shortcomings exist in Admiral Owens' argument. First, Admiral Owens maintains the assumption that technology and weapon systems can replace manpower. On the contrary, sustained or a possibly increased manpower will be necessary to maintain the information technology infrastructure and do the dirty work to clean up what the precision weapons missed. Second, he urges the DoD to cut back its reliance on defense contractors and form open relationships with "high-tech" companies. Moreover, the high-tech companies would build a satellite surveillance network to help the military meet the future threats. Unfortunately, it is hard to overlook that this argument might owe something to his position in a satellite corporation.

The book's stated aim is clear and seemingly non-controversial. Despite this, *Lifting the Fog of War* equates to views contrary to the establishment. However, in perspective, the 4th ID's recent digitized rotation at the NTC might have validated many of Admiral Owens' arguments for advanced technologies. Despite any criticism, this book is far-sighted and belongs on the bookshelf of "out-of-the-box" thinkers.

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**America and Guerrilla Warfare** by Anthony James Joes, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky., 2000, 418 pages, \$30.00 (cloth).

The arrival of this book comes at a propitious time, as we review our military strategies and needs for the 21st century. The possibility of American involvement in future guerrilla conflicts seems high, as long as we remain committed to the idea of peacekeeping, and Anthony James Joes has reached a surprising conclusion: Americans have generally enjoyed great success in this form of mission.

I say surprising because, for many American officers, steeped in the history of the Vietnam War, guerrilla warfare is anathema and to be avoided if possible. However, Joes, professor of international politics and director of the international relations program at St. Joseph's University, has examined nine guerrilla conflicts in which Americans played a leading and largely successful role, stretching from the American Revolution to the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s. His comparative analysis of American actions in these guerrilla wars picks out common threads and reaches this conclusion.

Joes' study examines the origins of each of these guerrilla conflicts, why Americans be-

came involved, and how they participated. While he expresses concern about being too quick to derive "lessons" from this study of history, Joes nonetheless finds that Americans have been generally successful in both the conduct of guerrilla war (given examples during the American Revolution and the American Civil War) and the combating of guerrilla movements (citing the examples of the Philippines, Nicaragua, Greece, El Salvador, and Afghanistan). In fact, he concludes that in the majority of these latter cases, American interests were successfully served without the direct involvement of American forces. Joes argues that the great exception was in Vietnam where U.S. interests were finally defeated, although not by the guerrilla war, but by American abandonment of its South Vietnamese ally, which in turn allowed the success of a massive North Vietnamese Army invasion.

Beyond the standard conclusion about carefully choosing to combat guerrilla movements only when that is in the national interest and can be defended to American public opinion, Joes argues that real victory in guerrilla war requires not just a military victory, but "an enduring peace." Joes' prescription for achieving this kind of peace is to limit bloodshed, to offer a peaceful alternative to the insurgency, and above all, by displaying rectitude in carrying out the counter-guerrilla campaign. To the extent that American counter-guerrilla warfare has been successful, as illustrated by these historical examples, Joes argues that it was because American policy generally followed such a course.

Joes' argument may stir up controversy and debate, but his ideas are thought-provoking. Well researched and well written, *America and Guerrilla Warfare* provides new insights into guerrilla conflict and how it should be fought, by reminding us of our own past success in this form of warfare. Professional officers and military historians alike will find this an engaging book, well worth their time.

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**Devil Dogs – Fighting Marines of World War I** by George B. Clark, Presidio Press, Inc., Novato, Calif., 1999 (2nd Edition printed in 2000), 463 pages, \$24.95.

The contributions of the United States Marines in the First World War have never been, to my knowledge, fully addressed by any author. Aside from some short works or reviews on the actions of the Corps in the Great War, perhaps most specifically at the battles of Belleau Wood and Chateau Thierry, a full-scale, in-depth study has never been attempted or accomplished.

Mr. Clark attempts to fill this void with *Devil Dogs*. His efforts to produce a complete study of the Marine brigades in France have filled a long overdue gap in Marine history. The author has published previously on Ma-

rine Corps history and is a former Marine himself, who quite evidently takes great pride in his association with the Corps. On an interesting note, Clark also owns and operates a bookstore specializing in military history.

The book does an excellent job in covering the history of the Corps, taking the reader from recruitment and training to deployment, conflict, the occupation of Germany and then demobilization. Clark ably shows how the Marines, although resented by General Pershing and the Army, which did not want a "second ground force," succeeded in making major contributions to the efforts of the American Expeditionary Forces. Most of the book is devoted to Belleau Wood, but Clark also provides excellent reviews and analyses of Verdun, Soissons, the Marbache Sector, the Meuse River Campaign, and Blanc Mont.

Unfortunately, Clark comes across sometimes as a bit wordy and he has a tendency to overwhelm the reader with details. At times I felt I was reviewing an AAR rather than a historical treatise. However, Clark eventually catches his stride with his story, using a very conversational style that is both unusual and refreshing. He is very open and candid in his assessments of leadership and ability. Of particular note is his extensive research utilizing every resource conceivable and available, especially diaries and personal accounts, to produce his book. He makes excellent use of maps, charts and graphics, as well as a good photographic section.

I found *Devil Dogs* to be a fascinating book and well worth the time to struggle through the occasional slow spots. For those interested in the First World War or the role of the Marines in that conflict, I'd not hesitate to recommend reading this work.

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**DIEN BIEN PHU: The Epic Battle America Forgot** by Howard R. Simpson, Brassey's Inc., Washington D.C., 1996, paperback, \$17.95 online.

Howard Simpson, in an authentic voice gained through experience at Dien Bien Phu as a U.S. Information Agency correspondent, writes this volume on the French defeat by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. While possessing a genuine flair for involving the reader in the action, the author is also to be commended for his meticulous research, including thorough interviews with surviving participants in the battle.

This book describes the events from the time when the first French forces were securing the isolated valley to the bitter defeat brought on by so many mistakes and failures of judgment. As the situation grows more desperate, and as it becomes clear that all will inevitably be lost, the reader's irritation mounts into a maddening frustration with the French leadership and their failure to either

adequately support or extricate the defenders from a clearly untenable situation. It is a testament to the skill of the author that his work can produce such strong feelings so many years after the event.

Most importantly, this text offers more than a tale of imperial collapse. It is a well-written treatise that portrays in stark detail the many strategic and tactical failures at Dien Bien Phu. Most regrettably, less than a decade after a cease-fire was finally signed in Geneva, U.S. and allied forces were fighting, dying, and relearning the awful lessons of the French experience in Indochina. Simpson offers a brilliant and tragic story that serves as both a lively introduction to the serious student of this battle and a gripping narrative of a lonely garrison under siege. A must-read for any serious student of low-intensity conflict.

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**Tides of War, A Novel of Alcibiades and the Peloponnesian War** by Steven Pressfield, New York, Doubleday, 2000, 429 pages, \$24.95 (hardcover).

Most of us might have only heard of Alcibiades from a line in the movie, "Patton." George C. Scott, speaking of Sicily, said that old Alcibiades knew Syracuse was the key to the island, and old Alcibiades always went for the jugular. Alcibiades was much more than that, as Steven Pressfield relates.

This is a work of historical fiction, but a book of power, leadership, and brave men. Pressfield drew from Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* for the setting of this story. This war between a land power, Sparta, and a sea power, Athens, provides the backdrop for a well-written novel of intrigue, a primer on leadership, and a thought-provoking look at a democracy waging war, a war that Athenian democracy lost.

Told as a story related from a grandfather to grandson, the story recounts the adventures of the man who killed Alcibiades. This is a powerful story as the assassin Polemides recounts the tale of the rise, fall, rise, and death of Alcibiades. Pressfield skillfully weaves all the characters of ancient Greece into the story, Socrates, Lysander, and Pericles. The war is fought on land in Greece and Sicily, on sea across the Mediterranean, and in the councils of both Sparta and Athens.

The story paints vivid word pictures of the infantryman's war on land, and the marine's war at sea. It is brutish and described as such. But Pressfield also tells a tale of a real leader of men.

Alcibiades is asked, "How does one lead free men?" He responds, "By being better than they, by being better and thus commanding their emulation. A commander's role is to model *arete*, excellence, before his

men. They will be compelled by their own nature to emulate it." Pressfield shows a commander who leads by example throughout his book. There are lessons of tactics, operational art, and even strategy in this book — all told through the eyes of the man who killed Alcibiades.

If you look for parallels between ancient days and today, you will find them. There are discussions of democracy and its need to tear down its leaders when they do not produce victory, or are too good, thus prompting the search for flaws. There are discussions of the role of the military and the use of force by a democracy.

The highest praise I reserve for a book is that it made me think, as well as educating and entertaining me. Take time after duty hours, find your favorite chair at home, and read of leaders and intrigue in ancient Greece. This is a timeless story of soldiers, honor, and duty.

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**Jeff Davis's Own: Cavalry, Comanches, and the Battle for the Texas Frontier** by James R. Arnold, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2000, 377 pages, \$30.00.

When Texas joined the Union in 1845, the United States gained a new state more than six times the size of Ohio and larger than France. Protecting the population of this vast new acquisition was added to the tasks of the already overstretched U.S. Army. As Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis wrote in 1853, the duty of repressing the hostilities among the Indian tribes and protecting frontier settlements from Indian depredations was the most difficult task the Army faced, and nowhere was it more difficult than in Texas.

At the time, there were only three mounted regiments in the Army: the 1st and 2nd Dragoons and the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen. In 1855, Congress finally authorized the creation of two additional mounted regiments, the 1st Cavalry Regiment and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Although both regiments were organized at about the same time, the 1st at Ft. Leavenworth and the 2nd at Jefferson Barracks, Secretary Davis paid particular attention to the staffing and equipping of the 2nd. With its hand-picked personnel, its thoroughbred horses, and the best of everything available, it soon became known as "Jeff Davis's Own" or "Jeff Davis's Pet." In *Jeff Davis's Own*, author Arnold recounts the story of the regiment from its formation to its evacuation from Texas at the start of the Civil War, as well as the regiment's first fighting in the war.

Cavalry was considered to be a new branch, probably Davis's handiwork to allow him to disregard branch seniority in selecting officers for the new regiments. Thus, he was

able to pick officers and appoint them to the senior levels of the regiment without regard to their current ranks. Appointed as colonel and regimental commander was Major Albert Sydney Johnston, once called by Zachary Taylor as "the best soldier he ever commanded," but also a close personal friend of Davis. As lieutenant colonel and second in command, Davis chose an engineer, West Point superintendent Robert E. Lee. The roster of officers included individuals who would gain senior rank and fame in the Civil War years: Majors William J. Hardee and George H. Thomas, Captains Earl Van Dorn and Edmund Kirby Smith, and Lieutenants John B. Hood and Fitzhugh Lee. Twenty of the 34 officers of the regiment were West Point graduates.

The regiment left Jefferson Barracks in October 1855 and arrived in Texas in December to begin its arduous frontier service. Until the Civil War, the principal enemy would be the Comanches. Told by the Mexicans that the whites could not be trusted, and already experienced in seeing white encroachment on their land, the Comanches violently resisted the pressure to move farther and farther west. They were superb riders and highly skilled with bow and arrow and lance. Raiding was a way of life with them and they ranged from Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) to Mexico, seizing horses and killing the unwary.

Never before had the Americans faced a foe such as this. A Comanche had no permanent abode and moved his family and belongings in minutes. Widely dispersed warrior bands could harry a long stretch of frontier and escape with impunity. The 2nd Cavalry soon found that most patrols that set out to pursue a hostile band found themselves outdistanced and on another fruitless mission. Yet occasionally, perseverance paid off, and the Indians could be brought to bay. The author describes in detail each of the regiment's major successes, as well as recounting the drudgery of uneventful routine patrols.

A great value of this book is the insight the author brings to describing the Texas environment: the relationship between civilians, the Army and the Texas Rangers, and the transition of the Indians as they were gradually worn down by the relentless pressure of the encroaching civilization. This book is much more than just the story of the 2nd Cavalry. It presents the reader with a knowledgeable analysis of the total Texas frontier and its inhabitants.

When Texas seceded and the Army's commanding general in the area gave up the Army's assets, the regiment was in a difficult position. That the regiment was withdrawn successfully was due in no small part to the skills of Lieutenant Colonel Lee. The regiment was soon in Virginia. It was redesignated the 5th Cavalry when all the mounted regiments were designated cavalry and all were numbered according to their dates of establishment. The regimental narrative closes with a recounting of service in the Penin-

sula Campaign. An appendix reminds the reader that the regiment has continued to serve, in the Pacific in World War II, in Korea, and in Vietnam. The appendix also includes a summary of the later careers of many of the officers who served in Texas.

This book is well-written and, more importantly, covers a period of frontier service that has not received the coverage it should have. Anyone interested in cavalry service in the West will find this book of great interest. In addition, 5th Cavalrymen of today will learn much of their regiment's early days.

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**Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor** by Robert B. Stinnett, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000, 260 pages, with 126 pages of detailed notes and a 12-page index, \$16.00.

This is a stunning, sobering, compelling, and disturbing book. When many are still arguing about our questionable entry into the Vietnam debacle, it comes somewhat as a shock to learn that one of our country's greatest presidents, Franklin Roosevelt, deliberately maneuvered the United States into World War II.

Not without reason. Germany had overrun The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, France, and North Africa. Italy had allied itself, however uneasily, with Germany, and the German-Italian Axis had signed a mutual assistance pact with Japan. Japan, in turn, was expanding rapidly into China. Russia, having taken over much of Poland as well as Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, was cautiously exploring Romania and Bulgaria while keeping up a pretense of friendship with Germany. By mid-1940, Hitler had decided to invade England. Roosevelt faced a terrible dilemma.

He was convinced that, should England fall, the future of the United States would be gravely endangered. Yet there were strong isolationist feelings in America where 88 percent of the population felt we should not become embroiled in a European war. Roosevelt was desperate to find ways to help England, but had campaigned on the promise that, "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." Even so, he had observed to his staff that "if somebody attacks us, then it isn't a foreign war, is it?"

Enter a young Navy officer, LCDR Arthur McCollum from the Office of Naval Intelligence. In October 1940, he wrote a memo that would have a crucial impact. He proposed eight actions that would incite the Japanese to attack both the United States forces in Hawaii and the British and Dutch bases in the Pacific. Every one of these actions was implemented, some within days. Action D was to send a division of heavy cruisers to the Orient. Roosevelt personally directed this provocative action, saying "I just want them to keep popping up here and

there and keep the Japs guessing. I don't mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six." Admiral Richardson, CINC U.S. Fleet, objected to placing his ships in harm's way to provoke a Japanese attack. So he was relieved!

This book tells in overwhelming detail the various steps taken deliberately by the President and his closest advisors to agitate the Japanese while simultaneously limiting information provided to the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii on the Japanese reactions. The detail is staggering, the disclosures disturbing. There seems to be no question that the President knew the attack was coming; only the exact timing and size of the attacking forces were unknown!

How has this information just now surfaced? Stinnett used the Freedom of Information Act to force the disclosure of much of it, an Act that was not available in previous attempts to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. (The author even dedicated the book to Congressman John Moss who wrote that Act.) Stinnett does not attempt to justify the morality of Roosevelt's decision and notes that this book "does not diminish Franklin Delano Roosevelt's magnificent contributions to the American people. His legacy should not be tarnished by the truth." Who he really blames are the security types who have under various guises kept this information from the public for over 50 years, far beyond any wartime — or peacetime — security needs.

To someone like this reviewer, who still remembers that tragic Sunday and who believed for years that our intelligence was simply faulty, this book comes as a bitter revelation of political exigency. To younger readers who are still arguing over the Vietnam affair or our entry into a hundred other political turmoils, this should be a real eye-opener. You want to believe we're always the guys in white hats? Go back and read Clausewitz and Machiavelli!

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**Battle Stations: Decisive Weapons of the Second World War** by Taylor Downing and Andrew Johnston, Pen and Sword Books Limited, Leo Cooper, 2000, 239 pages, \$29.95.

*Battle Stations: Decisive Weapons of the Second World War* is an entertaining survey of four decisive weapons: the Spitfire, the C-47 transport plane, the Sherman tank, and the DUKW amphibious truck. It is a companion to the History Channel's "Battle Stations" documentary series (available on VHS at HistoryChannel.com, \$59.95). I received my book the week the series aired and was able to compare the two.

I found book and series informative, interesting, and well organized. However the book and the documentary each provided details not found in the other. The book adequately stands apart from the documentary, a test

for any companion book. It provides backgrounds of each system, reasons they were designed, how they were designed, fateful decisions regarding their manufacture and employment, and the subsequent results. I found the authors' choice of "decisive" weapons curious, but they adequately plead their case.

The book appears historically accurate. Disappointingly, the authors excluded endnotes and bibliography. They included a useful index divided by system. Arranged throughout are informative sidebar insets relevant to the background of the subject. *Battle Stations* is written from a British point of view. It is just objective enough to glean a fair, relevant critique of history's mistakes and triumphs if taken with a pinch of salt.

The book contains 203 black and white photos arrayed to support the text. Twenty-four color photos extracted from action sequences shot for the television series are included in the back. The sequences involved re-enactors in appropriate uniforms employing equipment wonderfully preserved by dedicated collectors.

Armored warriors may find interest in the Sherman tank chapter. It illustrates the British and American militaries' willful negligence of crew safety in favor of mass production. Strategic planners relied on sheer numbers to defeat the German Army on the grand scale, overlooking the impact on allied crews at the tank-versus-tank level. This bears close scrutiny given the current drive to lighten the Armored Force.

I recommend the book and the videos to those in the acquisition field. Both offer a substantial independent or seminar study on the acquisition of modern military equipment. *Battle Stations* is not a vital addition to everyone's professional library. However, it provides interesting insights into the development and employment of military technology. Some lessons are worth review given today's Transitional Army.

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**Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965-October 1966** by Dr. John M. Carland, Center of Military History (<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/>), Washington, D.C., 2000, 410 pages; \$43.00 (cloth), \$36.00 (paper).

This book is the eighth in a series published by the Center of Military History on the topic of U.S. Army participation in the Vietnam War. In order for this volume to be viewed as a successful addition to the historiography already in existence, Dr. Carland faced three tasks: first, he had to set the overall historical setting without appearing to pass judgment; second, he had to tell the story of the development of U.S. combat operations in this theater to an audience which is, in many cases, intimately familiar with the actions

themselves; and lastly, he had to accomplish his first two tasks in a manner that created in his readers a desire for future volumes in the series. I am pleased to report that Dr. Carland's work succeeds in all three areas.

With regard to the first challenge, this book begins with a review of the geopolitical situation that ultimately resulted in the escalation of U.S. involvement. The first two chapters serve as a platform for describing the historical setting against which subsequent combat operations are set. The discussion of the political environment is quite satisfactory without overwhelming the reader with either superfluous details or biased opinion. The story of the deployment of the first two U.S. brigades (the 173rd Airborne Brigade, followed by the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division) transitions smoothly to a brief description of the deployments of the 1st Cavalry Division and the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division. The reader needs this background in order to fully appreciate some of the challenges faced by these "early-entry" forces. With the historic setting complete, the author embarks on what is, in my opinion, the greatest of his challenges: the discussion of the early combat operations from May 1965 to October 1966.

It must be difficult for an historian to describe actions that occurred in the not too distant past to an audience that in many cases actually participated in the events under review. The temptation to embellish the events to somehow lend credibility must be strong, but in my opinion Dr. Carland resisted that temptation and presents the reader with a balanced and historically accurate account of these early combat operations. The reader will find sections that flow smoothly one into another, all the while keeping in touch with the overall theme of the work itself. Readers familiar with more detailed singular accounts of specific actions (the story of LZ X-Ray, for example) will find the author's treatment of certain combat actions more than adequate without attempting to replace those works which serve as authoritative references. For those readers who are not yet familiar with the specifics of some of the early Vietnam War combat actions, this work will serve as an excellent introduction. The storytelling is all the richer for the inclusion of numerous photos and illustrations.

Dr. Carland succeeds with regard to the third task because this volume is well-written, extremely well-documented (the footnotes and bibliography alone make this work a worthwhile addition to any military historian's collection), and told without a hint of bias. The work will appeal to both amateur as well as professional military historians; the former because of the manner in which the story of combat operations is told, and the latter because of the detailed research conducted by the author. I recommend this book as a "must-have" addition to your library of works on the Vietnam War.

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